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INTRODUCTION

Stories of Cuban athletes leaving the communist isle for the
capitalist pastures of the United States read like a movie script. Worldclass Cuban baseball players, in pursuit of a better life, have allegedly
been “kidnapped, held hostage, forced to sign binding documents at
gun- and knifepoint, threatened with mutilation and terrorized by those
from some of the world’s most murderous gangs.” 1 But this is no
1. See Jeff Passan, 10 Degrees: Cuban Trafficking Grows into MLB’s Ugly Secret,
YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr. 20, 2014, 11:47 PM), https://sports.yahoo.com/news/10-degrees—
cuban-trafficking-grows-into-mlb-s-ugly-secret-034704407.html
[https://perma.cc/G3TYG4MT].
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movie; every day, Cuban baseball players are sacrificing their lives by
traveling to the United States in order to achieve their dream of
securing a contract from one of thirty Major League Baseball (“MLB”)
organizations.
US economic sanctions and MLB’s implementation of prohibitive
rules against Cuba have significantly limited the paths by which Cuban
citizens can legally and safely come to the United States to play
baseball. 2 Generally, Cuban baseball players have been forced to
escape Cuba under false auspices, clandestinely travel to a third
country, and hastily obtain questionably legal residency there prior to
signing a lucrative contract with an MLB club. 3 Unsurprisingly, this
dangerous process known as defection often involves corrupt human
trafficking and a multitude of international financial crimes by the
players, their representatives, MLB teams, and even MLB itself. 4
This defection process was the status quo until December 19,
2018, when MLB and the Cuban Baseball Federation (FCB) entered
into an agreement (2018 MLB-FCB Agreement) that would
purportedly bring an end to defection, the human trafficking of Cuban
baseball players, and the international financial criminal violations
inherent in the process. 5 The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement, which
President Barack Obama’s Treasury Department made possible
through the granting of a general license, 6 and a policy interpretation

2. See Rachel D. Solomon, Cuban Baseball Players, The Unlucky Ones: United StatesCuban Professional Baseball Relations Should be an Integral Part of the United States-Cuban
Relationship, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 153, 156-58 (2011) (discussing the economic restrictions on
the freedom of Cuban baseball players and MLB’s eligibility rules).
3. Id. at 157.
4. See, e.g., Dara Lind, Major League Baseball’s Human Trafficking Problem, VOX
(Sept. 15, 2014, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2014/9/15/6147663/baseball-playerstrafficking-cuba-puig-cartels-smuggling [https://perma.cc/72PG-3SPR]; Jeff Passan, Sources: A
Federal Grand Jury is Investigating MLB’s International Dealings, and Officials on all Sides
Are Worried, YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 28, 2018, 1:58 AM), https://sports.yahoo.com/sourcesfederal-grand-jury-investigating-mlbs-international-dealings-officials-sides-worried055827471.html [https://perma.cc/LTB8-Q9TB].
5. MLB, MLBPA Reach Deal with Cuban Federation, MLB NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.mlb.com/news/mlb-announces-deal-with-cuban-federation-c302036110
[https://perma.cc/Y63Z-XWS5] [hereinafter MLB Announcement].
6. Mark Townsend, OFAC Confirms Stance on Unblocking Cuban Baseball Players,
YAHOO! SPORTS (Jan. 31, 2015, 2:27 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/mlb-big-leaguestew/ofac-reaches-out-to-yoan-moncada—othercuban-stars-062132165.html
[https://perma.cc/VR8E-S7F2].
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that concluded FCB was not a branch of the Cuban government, 7
allowed MLB clubs to safely and legally sign players directly from
Cuba. 8 As part of this agreement, a percentage of that player’s salary
would be funneled into the FCB for the purpose of improving the
baseball infrastructure in Cuba. 9
This historic agreement was short-lived. On April 8, 2019 the
Trump Administration moved to strictly reinforce the Cuban embargo
in an attempt to “expose the crimes of the Castro regime,” and force
democratic change upon a Cuban government which “spread violence
and instability in the region.” 10 This strict reinforcement included a
complete cancellation of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement. 11 In an
abrupt reversal, the Trump Administration’s Treasury Department
determined that the FCB was in fact a branch of the Cuban government,
and thus any payment remitted to it through MLB contracts was strictly
prohibited under existing sanctions against the communist state.12
Further, any contract with Cuban defectors would now only be
approved through a more restrictive specific license, effectively
destroying the 2018 MLB-FCB agreement. 13
This Note will explore whether the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement
or the Trump Administration’s cancellation of said agreement is more
in line with the objectives of the United States’ sanctions against Cuba.
Part II will examine the history of economic sanctions against Cuba
through present day. Part III will analyze the exceptions to those
sanctions, and the US Treasury’s role in granting licenses that
circumvent the prohibitive sanctions. Part IV will discuss MLB’s role
in adhering to the economic sanctions against Cuba. Part V will
7. MLB Announcement, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. Id.; Andrew Zimbalist, Trump Administration’s Nixing of MLB Player Transfer Deal
with
Cuba
is
Bad
Policy,
FORBES
(Apr.
11,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewzimbalist/2019/04/11/trump-mlb-cuba/#1b11094a5b19
[https://perma.cc/CQ9S-3BUX].
10. Dan Merica, Trump Unveils New Restrictions on Travel, Business with Cuba, CNN
(June 17, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www-m.cnn.com/2017/06/16/politics/trump-cubapolicy/index.html?r=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F [https://perma.cc/6L4C-S855];
Zimbalist, supra note 9.
11. Jared Diamond & Vivian Salama, Trump Administration Blocks Baseball Players
From Cuba, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2019, 9:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumpadministration-set-to-tighten-rules-for-baseball-players-from-cuba-11554747444
[https://perma.cc/3AHS-NJML].
12. Id.
13. Id.
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examine the terms of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement and delineate the
arguments by the MLB in favor of the agreement, and by the Trump
Administration opposing the agreement. Part VI will present a forwardlooking analysis, including reasonable solutions on how MLB and the
Trump Administration can curb human trafficking and end the crimes
inherent in the defection process, while still complying with the strictly
enforced embargo.
II. EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA:
NATIONAL SECURITY OR POLITICAL RETRIBUTION?
In order to best understand the two sides of the 2018 MLB-FCB
Agreement, it is crucial to examine the history of sanctions that have
hamstrung United States and Cuba relations. The initial authority for
the United States’ embargo against Cuba originates from the 1917
Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”), which bans transfers of
property between US citizens and enemy nations, unless authorized by
the President. 14 The TWEA maintains that, during wartime, the
President may:
[I]nvestigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or
prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer,
withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or
dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect
to, or transaction involving, any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest, by any person, or
with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. 15

In other words, the TWEA vests the executive with the authority
to place economic embargos on enemy nations. 16 In 1933, Congress
extended TWEA past its wartime application, to include circumstances
of “existing national emergency.” 17 The definition of “existing national
emergency” has been widely interpreted to vest the President with the
power to enforce embargos upon foreign countries irrespective of a

14. Trading with the Enemy Act, 12 U.S.C. §95a (2010).
15. Id. at §95a(1)(B).
16. See Scott M. Cwiertney, The Need for a Worldwide Draft: Major League Baseball and
Its Relationship with the Cuban Embargo and United States Foreign Policy, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L. REV. 391, 395-97 (2000).
17. See id. at 396 (discussing 40 Stat. 966, March 9, 1933, ch 1, Title I, § 2).
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declaration of war, and without even a declarative or specific national
crisis. 18
Under the aforementioned TWEA authority, Congress codified
the thrust of the Cuban Embargo in 1963 with the enactment of the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR). The CACR prohibits
“transactions incident to travel to, from, and within Cuba” and, most
importantly, “payment or transfer” of funds to Cuban Nationals.19
Before the Communist Cuban Revolution of 1959, the major impetus
for these sanctions, over one hundred Cuban nationals played Major
League Baseball in the United States and could freely sign with any
MLB club. 20 The CACR banned MLB clubs from performing any
business in Cuba, including scouting or signing players. 21 The United
States may criminally prosecute anyone who violates the TWEA or the
CACR. 22
National security was the initial justification for the embargo. 23 In
his proclamation announcing the initial restrictions, President Kennedy
stated the purpose of the sanctions was to reduce the threat to America
and its ideals posed by Cuba’s alignment with communist powers.24 In
other words, Kennedy recognized that national security and democracy
were paramount to the enactment and ultimate success of the embargo.
The CACR had numerous additional objectives, each aimed at
destabilizing the Cuban communist regime and keeping American soil
safe. One of the stated goals of the CACR was to “isolate the Cuban
government economically and deprive it of U.S. dollars.” 25 Courts have
also maintained that the objectives underlying the TWEA and the
CACR are: (1) to deny to Cuba or its nationals hard currency which
might be used to promote activities inimical to the interests of the
United States; (2) to retain blocked funds for possible use to settle
18. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 169; see also Cwiertney, supra note 16, at 396-97 (citing
United States v. Fernandez-Pertierra, 523 F. Supp. 1135, 1137 (S.D. Fla. 1981)).
19. Cuban Asset Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.415(a)(1), (6) & (7) (2016).
20. Cwiertney, supra note 16, at 391.
21. Matthew Frankel, Major League Problems: Baseball’s Broken System of Cuban
Defection, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 383, 393-94 (2005).
22. Cwiertney, supra note 16, at 397.
23. See id. at 395-96.
24. See Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. § 26 (Supp. 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb. 6,
1962) reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (2008).
25. The US Embargo Against Cuba: Its Impact on Economic and Social Rights,
AMNESTY INT’L 8 (Sept. 2009), http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/amr250072009eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2L2-STU5].
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claims against the Cuban government, or to vest to the United States if
necessary; and (3) to use blocked funds for negotiation purposes in
discussions with the Cuban government. 26
For thirty years, the CACR served as the primary legislative tool
for restricting financial ties between the United States and Cuba. In the
early 1990s, in response to decades of communist influence in Cuba
and, purportedly, national security concerns after Cuba downed two
unarmed US civilian aircrafts, 27 the United States passed the Cuban
Democracy Act (“CDA”) of 1992, 28 and the Helms-Burton Act of
1996, 29 which tightened the grip of the Cuban sanctions. The CDA
extended the sanctions to include a “ban on conducting business in
Cuba to U.S.-owned or controlled business located overseas.” 30 The
Helms-Burton Act required the US government to enforce the CACR,
doubling down on the ban that restricts MLB clubs from signing and
scouting Cuban players. 31 The Helms-Burton Act continues the
embargo indefinitely by maintaining all of the CACR restrictions until
a democratically elected government is in power in Cuba and by
requiring Congressional approval before the US President may lift the
embargo. 32 The stated purposes of the CDA and the Helms-Burton Act
were, again, national security with the aim of forcing the adoption of a
democratically elected government in Cuba. 33
Through the latter part of the 20th century, the US government’s
position toward Cuba remained largely unchanged. The Clinton
administration recognized the importance of providing aid to regular

26. Miranda v. Secretary of the Treasury, 766 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Real v.
Simon, 510 F.2d 557, 563 (5th Cir. 1975), reh’g denied, 514 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1975)).
27. Civilian U.S. Planes Shot Down Near Cuba, CNN (Feb. 24, 1996, 12:45 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/US/9602/cuba_shootdown/ [https://perma.cc/6ZUV-5W3N]; Tim Weiner,
Clinton Considers Punishing Cubans for Plane Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 1996),
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/26/world/clinton-considers-punishing-cubans-for-planeattack.html [https://perma.cc/KY2W-62QF].
28. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6001 (2009) [hereinafter CDA].
29. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6021
(2009) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act].
30. CDA, supra note 28, at § 6005.
31. See Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C.S. § 6032(c); see also Frankel, supra note 21, at 39394.
32. See Anna Kaminsky, A Major Smuggle Struggle: It’s Time for Major League Baseball
to Step up to the Plate and Alleviate Its Cuban Smuggling Problem, 24 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 193, 198 (2016).
33. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 170.
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Cuban citizens, 34 so long as it circumvented the federal government.35
In fact, in 1999 as a show of good faith toward this policy, President
Clinton enabled two exhibition games between the Cuban National
Baseball Team and one of the MLB clubs, with a provision that the
profits be given only to humanitarian Cuban charities rather than to
Castro’s regime. 36 Despite these in-roads, Clinton’s successor,
President George W. Bush, was an ardent advocate of the Cuban
embargo and took various actions to visibly enforce its provisions. 37
The Obama administration achieved significant progress in
improving relations with Cuba. The administration passed the Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 2009, authorizing the easing of travel and
finance restrictions against Cuba. 38 In 2015, President Obama and thenCuban leader Raul Castro announced that the United States and Cuba
would formally re-establish diplomatic relations, in an effort to
“promote . . . change in Cuba . . . in line with U.S. national security
interests.” 39 Prior to 2015, sanctions prevented Cubans who were
legally present in the United States from earning stipends and salaries
in excess of the individual’s living expenses. 40 This relaxation of
sanctions permitted Cuban citizens in the United States to receive a
34. See generally Matthew N. Greller, Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Fastball
Pitchers Yearning for Strike Three: How Baseball Diplomacy Can Revitalize Major League
Baseball and United States-Cuba Relations, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1647 (1999) (examining
the Clinton Administration’s efforts to assist the Cuban people during the Castro regime).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 1650-52.
37. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 173 (discussing how Bush wanted to restrict Cuba from
the WBC, although he eventually allowed them to participate after Castro promised to donate
all of the proceeds to the victims of Hurricane Katrina).
38. See generally Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 111-8, 2009 H.R. 1105 (2009);
see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-951R, U.S. EMBARGO ON CUBA:
RECENT REGULATORY CHANGES AND POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL OR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
8, (Sept. 17, 2009) (authorizing the easing of restrictions against Cuba).
39. Peter Baker, Starting Friday, U.S. Will Ease Restrictions on Travel to Cuba, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/16/world/americas/us-easesdecades-old-rules-on-travel-to-cuba.html [https://perma.cc/V6K2-NTK4]; see also Bureau of
Western Hemisphere, Fact Sheet: U.S. Relations with Cuba, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 21,
2015), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm [https:/perma.cc/T6CSVEUR].
40. Merrit Kennedy, U.S. Eases Sanctions Against Cuba Ahead of Obama’s Landmark
Visit, NPR (Mar. 15, 2016, 2:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/03/15/470541369/u-s-eases-sanctions-against-cuba-ahead-of-obamas-landmarkvisit [https://perma.cc/P5PT-NAFB]; OFAC and BIS Announce Additional Amendments to
Cuba Sanctions in Advance of President Obama’s Historic Visit to Cuba, BAKER BOTTS LLP
(Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3d0fae1d-beac-4a88-961500b822e5bed5 [https://perma.cc/3M97-JTGH].
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more substantial salary from US companies, so long as the Cuban
government did not subject the Cuban national to any special tax
assessments in connection with receipt of the salary. 41
This progress came to an end with the election of President
Trump. In 2017, in a notice issued by the State Department, President
Trump announced a new policy with regards to Cuba, undoing the
Obama-era leniency toward the communist state. 42 The new Trump-era
policy restricts US dollars flowing into the Cuban economy by any
means. 43 The goal of this policy, as explained by President Trump, is
“guided by the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States, as well as solidarity with the Cuban people.” 44
The administration’s activation of a controversial section of the
Helms-Burton Act, which allows Cuban Americans to sue companies
“trafficking” in property confiscated during the 1959 revolution in US
courts, 45 exhibited this strict stance toward Cuba. 46 This move is proof
of renewed executive fervor against Cuba’s attempts to bolster its
economy. Further, in April 2017, Former National Security Advisor
John Bolton announced that the US Treasury Department will end “Uturn transactions” that allow Cuba to circumvent sanctions and get
access to “hard currency and the U.S. banking system.” 47 He also
announced new limits on remittances to Cuba of US$1,000 per person,
41. 31 C.F.R. § 515.571(a)(5)(i) (2016).
42. Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba, 82 Fed. Reg. 48875 (Oct.
20, 2017).
43. Id. at 48876.
44. Id.
45. See Alex Daugherty & Michael Wilner, Trump to Allow Cuban Americans to Sue for
Confiscated
Property
in
Cuba,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Apr.
16,
2019),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article229321599.html
[https://perma.cc/DFL3-R68C]; Stephen Wicary, Trump Nears Key Cuba Sanctions Decision
Over
Support
for
Maduro,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
27,
2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-27/trump-nears-key-cuba-sanctionsdecision-over-support-for-maduro [https://perma.cc/K4R2-3QVE].
46. Id.; Sam Kleiner & Lee Wolosky, Trump Administration’s New Cuba Policy Threatens
Discord
With
U.S.
Allies,
JUST
SECURITY
(Apr.
25,
2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/63795/trump-administrations-new-cuba-policy-threatens-discordwith-u-s-allies/ [https://perma.cc/6HPL-Q4WK].
47. Nick Wadhams & Nikos Chrysoloras, Trump’s Cuba Reversal on Seized Property
Challenged
by
Allies,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
17,
2019),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X8EH7520000000?resource_id=a6a7
ea796f6719464b377a80238b7847&search32=UkJZhb5yYJWsOHkGWzHpEQ%3D%3D_YJp
_KwBSCtt7xiQkVEFLPXYpxYTy2BOOh5ZaUFt97OXbj58aSMBlWIuw9DdVJdg&udv_exp
ired=true [https://perma.cc/W8F5-4BRS].
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per quarter. In 2017, the State Department estimated that individuals in
the United States sent about US$3.5 billion in remittances to family
members in Cuba. 48
The recent tightening of sanctions is an attempt to pressure Cuba
into withdrawing its support from Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro,
the controversial socialist president who has long supported Cuba’s
despotic regime. 49 Although the United States has launched economic
sanctions against Venezuela, the country is still receiving resources
from other countries, including Cuba. 50 On April 30, 2019 President
Trump tweeted that he would impose “a full and complete embargo”
on Cuba if the island doesn’t withdraw its security aid from what he
considers to be a tyrannical dictatorship in Venezuela. 51 In October
2019, the Trump Administration prepared a new set of sanctions
against Cuba over its continued support for Maduro in Venezuela.52
The new sanctions specifically targeted Cuba’s tourism sector by
suspending flights from the United States to nine airports in Cuba in an
attempt to “squeeze” Cuba economically. 53 US policy toward Cuba is
highly volatile, changing on a day-to-day basis, and it remains to be
seen how the Trump Administration will respond to the crisis in
Venezuela amid Cuba’s involvement. 54

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 30, 2019, 5:09 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/112333350807899750
[https://perma.cc/EG7L2UA6].
52. See Jessica Campisi, U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on Cuba Over Human Rights,
Venezuela, THE HILL (Oct. 18, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/466550-usimposes-new-sanctions-on-cuba-over-human-rights-venezuela [https://perma.cc/Q734-3XTB];
Matt Spetalnick & Luc Cohen, Exclusive: As Trump Grows Frustrated on Venezuela, U.S. to
‘Squeeze’ Cuba, Scrutinize Russia, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-venezuela-exclusive/exclusive-as-trump-grows-frustrated-on-venezuela-us-to-squeezecuba-scrutinize-russia-idUSKBN1WO2CL [https://perma.cc/9MPX-EYFF].
53. Id; see also Zach Montague, Trump Administration Cuts Flights to Most Cuban
Airports, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/25/us/politics/flightscuba-trump.html [https://perma.cc/9ACZ-PQQC].
54. This Note does not consider events past October 31, 2019.
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III. OFAC LICENSING: TO REVIEW OR NOT TO REVIEW THE
EXCEPTIONS TO THE SANCTIONS
The TWEA gives authority to the President to control all
transactions between the United States and any covered nation under
the TWEA, including Cuba. 55 However, the TWEA gives the Secretary
of the Treasury the authority to promulgate regulations enforcing the
aims of the TWEA. 56 As part of this enforcement, the US Treasury’s
Office of Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) has authority under the
CACR to grant specific and general licenses exempting certain
individuals and enterprises from the reach of the omnibus sanctions. 57
OFAC can authorize a license to enable an individual or a
business entity to conduct business in Cuba with Cuban citizens or to
unblock a restricted Cuban national. 58 The US Treasury Department
defines a license as an “authorization from OFAC to engage in a
transaction that otherwise would be prohibited.” 59 There are two types
of licenses: specific licenses and general licenses. A specific license is
a formal written document issued by OFAC on a case-by-case basis,
authorizing a particular transaction on a limited basis and only in
response to a written application. 60 A general license, on the other hand,
authorizes a particular type of transaction for a broader class of persons
without the need to continually apply for a license. 61
OFAC has broad discretion in deciding when to issue licenses that
authorize otherwise prohibited business dealings. 62 OFAC may amend
or rescind existing licenses at any time as long as the decision is
reasonably related to foreign policy concerns, and courts typically
55. Trading with the Enemy Act, 12 U.S.C. §95a (2010).
56. 31 C.F.R. § 515.802 (1999).
57. 31 C.F.R § 515.505 (2016) (prohibiting, among other things, the “withdrawal from the
United States of . . . currency” to Cuba without the authorization of the Secretary of the
Treasury); see also Lynn R. Coleman & Thomas R. Graham, The Stars and Stripes Wherever:
The Impact of Unilateral U.S. Economic Sanctions on the International Petroleum Industry, 35
ALTA. L. REV. 334, 338 (1996).
58. 31 C.F.R § 515.505 (2016).
59. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, RES. CTR. (2019), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/faqs/sanctions/pages/faq_general.aspx [https://perma.cc/432G-5CV4].
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Court E. Golumbic & Robert S. Ruff III, ARTICLE: Leveraging the Three Core
Competencies: How OFAC Licensing Optimizes Holistic Sanctions, 38 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 729, 783-85 (2013) (analyzing OFAC’s lack of transparency in the licensing process as a
means to maintain its discretion in granting or not granting licenses).
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interpret these decisions with great deference to OFAC. 63 OFAC’s
interpretation of its own regulations receives Auer deference, which
calls for OFAC’s own interpretation to be given controlling weight
unless the interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation or statute. 64 Interestingly enough, OFAC does not issue
opinions, explain its reasoning, or discuss individual license
applications and denials thereof with the media. 65 OFAC decisions are
not immune from judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”)—however, OFAC decisions that are based on substantial
evidence and that are not arbitrary or capricious must be affirmed by
the reviewing court. 66 Further, any regulatory announcement by OFAC
is merely a policy decision that can easily be reversed or narrowed.67
OFAC can revisit a license proclamation and reinterpret it or reverse it,
often based on pressure from the executive branch. 68
There is extensive evidence of this OFAC action in the past
decade through its relationship with MLB. In 2012, MLB formally
announced the requirement that Cuban players must receive a specific
license from OFAC before they could sign with an MLB franchise.69
Under this policy, teams were not able to sign Cuban nationals until
OFAC had issued a specific license to that player, effectively slowing
the license application process to a standstill and restricting access to
the United States for these players. 70 To acquire a specific license, a
Cuban-born player would have to establish residency in a third-party
country, where a team would then have to individually request that the
63. See Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding OFAC’s
authority to deny a license to travel to Cuba is reasonable when considered in light of foreign
policy concerns).
64. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); see also Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry,
27 F.3d 695, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating OFAC interpretation of Sanctions Regulations
accords greater judicial deference because such regulations are OFAC regulations).
65. See generally Jack Curry, Baseball: New Effort by MLB to Include Cuba in World
Classic, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2005), at D3 (reviewing MLB’s revised application for OFAC
special license permitting Cuban participation).
66. See John O’Brien, Political Balk: Opening the Door for U.S.-Cuba Policy Reform via
Diplomatic Blunder at the World Baseball Classic, 15 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 135,
161-62 (2008).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 160-62.
69. See Aaron Klein & Jake E. Marcus, United States-Cuba Normalized Relations and the
MLB Influence: The Baseball Coalition Committee, 47 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 258, 285
(2016).
70. Id. at 285.
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specific player be “unblocked” by OFAC before being able to sign the
player to a contract. 71 MLB’s attempts to quell human trafficking
violations where smugglers were falsifying passports and other
residency documents triggered this rule change. 72 By sending all
unblocking residency paperwork to OFAC, the league could defer to a
governing body more equipped to handle immigration processes and
verification. 73 The specific license application process requires
evidence that the player established permanent residence in a third
country and that the player never intends to return to Cuba. 74
That policy rapidly changed thereafter, with President Obama’s
2014 announcement regarding the expansion of general licenses for
individuals and businesses wishing to conduct financial transactions in
Cuba or with Cuban nationals. 75 This sweeping change permitted
businesses in the United States to more readily obtain general licenses,
which are required in order to negotiate with and hire Cuban nationals,
as long as no funds are paid to the Cuban government in connection
with the hire. MLB obtained a general license to contract with all
Cuban defectors, eliminating the cumbersome specific license
process. 76 For example, when Cuban outfielder Yoan Moncada became
the first player to apply to OFAC for a specific license following the
announcement, 77 OFAC responded by stating that it “will not grant a
specific license to Cuban nationals who are already unblocked via the
general license.” 78 In other words, because Moncada met the
prerequisites of MLB’s general unblocking license—he possessed at
least two permanent residency documents from a third country—he
need not apply for a specific license after the Obama proclamation.79
This significantly eased the requirements for Cubans to play baseball
71. See Drew M. Goorabian, Baseball’s Cuban Missile Crisis: How the United States and
Major League Baseball Can End Cuban Ballplayer Trafficking, 20 UCLA J. INT’L L. FOREIGN
AFF. 425, 441 (2016).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 442.
74. Id.
75. 31 C.F.R. § 515.505. Under the new general license in Section 515.505 of Treasury’s
Cuban Asset Control Regulations, Cuban nationals can become unblocked if they take up
permanent residence outside of Cuba, obtain required residence documentation and show they
are not a prohibited Cuban government official or member of the Cuban Communist Party.
76. Klein & Marcus, supra note 69, at 303.
77. See id.
78. Townsend, supra note 6.
79. See id.
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in the major leagues. Because all defectors were now covered under the
general license, all that was required of the players at the time was to
defect, obtain legal residency in a third country, and sign a statement
saying that they had abandoned their Cuban citizenship forever. 80 They
no longer needed to wait through a lengthy and uncertain approval
process for a specific license. 81 However, many, including the new
OFAC department in the Trump Administration, see the Obama-era
general license relaxation as an endorsement or clear stimulus to unsafe
defection, human trafficking, and illegal payments to the Cuban
government. 82
IV. THE NECESSITY OF DEFECTION: MLB’S INTERACTION
WITH THE CUBAN SANCTIONS
In 1961, Fidel Castro abolished professional baseball in Cuba,
instituting an amateur-only league, with players receiving minuscule
wages in conformance with the paradigm of national ideals over free
enterprise. 83 The average Cuban player makes the equivalent of
roughly US$40 per month. 84 On the other hand, the average MLB
salary is close to US$300,000 per month.85 Cubans, especially Cuban
athletes with a chance to earn substantially more money outside of the
communist regime, began defecting in significant numbers. 86
Initially, MLB took a very hard stance against Cuban nationals,
in-line with the strict adherence to the CACR at the time. In 1977, MLB
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn issued a directive, which was updated in
1991, and then again as recently as 2016, to enforce the prohibition on
“[team’s] discussion or negotiation with anyone in Cuba regarding the
signing of any player in Cuba.” 87 In other words, MLB fully intended
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Frankel, supra note 21, at 390.
84. Michael Powell, For Cuban Players, No Embargo on Dream, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/sports/baseball/in-cuba-no-embargo-on-hope-asbaseball-players-say-take-me-to-america.html [https://perma.cc/B5LR-3WPJ]. In 2014, “[t]he
Cuban government pays the baseball players, who make, on average, $40 a month.” Id.
85. See Jim Woodruff, How Much Money do Baseball Players Make?, CHRON (June 29,
2018),
https://work.chron.com/much-money-baseball-players-make-14452.html
[https://perma.cc/JQ9F-LC5D] (stating that the average Major League Baseball Player earned
US$4.38 Million in 2018).
86. See generally Solomon, supra note 2.
87. Frankel, supra note 21, at 397; see also Greller, supra note 34, at 1664-65.
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to cooperate with the restrictions of the CACR and enforce any
violations of the CACR by member teams. 88 Thus, Cuban players had
virtually no legal route to the United States and the major leagues.
However, teams and agents saw that this directive created a dangerous
loophole that MLB teams and human traffickers exploited. 89 A player
would defect to a third country, obtain residency, and enter the United
States stripped of their Cuban citizenship and able to sign with any
MLB club for a substantial salary without violating the CACR or the
MLB rules enforcing it. 90
MLB rules indicate that any resident of the United States or
Canada or any student enrolled in high school or college in the United
States who has never before signed a major league or minor league
contract is subject to the amateur draft – a lottery process by which
teams are allowed to select and sign players to their clubs for close to
amateur salary. 91 However, international players are not subject to the
amateur draft, and may sign with any club they choose as “free agents,”
typically for a much higher salary. 92 That is, of course, except Cuban
international players who, if they safely defect directly to the United
States, are the only international born players forced to participate in
the less lucrative amateur draft. 93 Therefore, if a Cuban player defects
to a third country and establishes legal residency there, that player is
not subject to the general amateur draft rule, which limits the amount
of money the player can make as well as team flexibility and additional
MLB options. 94 Instead, these players bypass the draft and sign a
contract with a team of their choice as free agents, usually for much
more money. 95
American jurisprudence and MLB policy substantiated this
loophole when, in 2001, Cuban ballplayer Rolando Viera defected
directly to the United States from Cuba, receiving refugee status on his
visa, meaning the Cuban pitcher would be subjected to the amateur

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See generally Greller, supra note 34.
Cwiertney, supra note 16, at 412.
See generally Cwiertney, supra note 16.
See Frankel, supra note 21, at 397.
Id.
Id.
See Cwiertney, supra note 16, at 412-13.
Id. at 413-14.
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draft. 96 Viera filed a motion for emergency injunctive relief, trying to
prevent MLB from interfering with his ability to act as a free agent. He
argued that the difficulties in defecting and the salary restrictions
inherent in the draft were discriminatory towards Cuban players. 97
MLB successfully opposed these motions, which effectively
strengthened the defection regime and actually encouraged the third
country residency path toward free agency, legitimizing these
dangerous loopholes. 98 Since 1991, over two hundred Cuban
ballplayers have attempted defection, with only a small fraction being
awarded a lucrative contract by an MLB club. 99
V. THE 2018 MLB-FCB AGREEMENT: DETAILS AND ANALYSIS
Largely in response to the loophole in CACR-MLB enforcement,
MLB and the FCB reached the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement, which
allowed for the safe and legal signing of Cuban nationals to MLB
clubs. 100 MLB and the FCB announced the three-year deal on
December 19, 2018. 101 Its stated objective was to “end the dangerous
trafficking of Cuban players who desire to play professional baseball
in the United States.” 102 MLB cited similarly structured deals with the
Japanese league, the Korean Baseball Organization, and the Chinese
Professional Baseball league as precedent for success of this type of
financial model. 103 The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement required the FCB
to release all players under contract who are at least twenty-five years
old and have six or more years of playing experience for free agency. 104
From there, the players are free to negotiate and sign with any MLB
club without leaving Cuba, and may return to Cuba during the offseason 105—a sharp reversal from decades of tightly enforced
96. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Baseball Diplomacy, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 473,
482 (2001).
97. See Evan Brewster, Cuban Baseball Players in America: Changing the Difficult Route
to Chasing the Dream, 5 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 215, 225 (2016).
98. Id. at 225 (citing Viera v. Major League Baseball Enters., No. 8:01-CV-1037-T27MAP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26155 (M.D. Fla. June 4, 2001)).
99. Klein & Marcus, supra note 69, at 271.
100. MLB Announcement, supra note 5.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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restrictions on negotiating with Cuban nationals. An existing general
license granted by OFAC at the tail end of the Obama Administration
made the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement possible. 106 OFAC’s
determination that the FCB was independent of the central Cuban
government was also crucial in enabling this agreement. 107
However, there is a significant wrinkle in the 2018 MLB-FCB
Agreement that sent shockwaves through policymakers’ offices in
Washington. An MLB club that signs a player released by the FCB
pursuant to this agreement would be forced to pay the FCB a “release
fee.” 108 This is permitted by the OFAC license and determination, as
well as an agreement from the Cuban government not to charge the
players “any special tax” beyond that assessed on any other Cuban
national who works abroad. 109 Despite OFAC’s determination
regarding the FCB’s independence from the Cuban Government, many
lawmakers were not convinced. 110
Cuban Ambassador Jose Ramon Cabanas expressed his
government’s support for the deal—fueled in part by the Vice President
of the FCB, Antonio Castro—the youngest son of Fidel Castro—a fact
certainly not lost upon opponents of the 2018 MLB-FCB

106. Jordan Kobritz, An Analysis of What the Deal Between MLB and the Cuban Baseball
Federation Means to the Sport, SPORTS LAW EXPERT (Dec. 24, 2018),
https://sportslawexpert.com/2018/12/24/exclusive-an-analysis-of-what-the-deal-between-mlband-the-cuban-baseball-federation-means-to-the-sport/ [https://perma.cc/QK9Z-TCX7] (“MLB
believes the proposed arrangement is permitted under provisions of a general license it received
from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in 2016”).
107. Diamond & Salama, supra note 11.
108. Id. The Release Fee owed to the FCB by the MLB Club that signs an FCB Player is
calculated using the same formula embodied in MLB’s agreements with the NPB, KBO, and
CPBL (i.e., between fifteen percent and twenty percent of the total guaranteed value for Major
League contracts, and twenty-five percent of the signing bonus for Minor League contracts. In
addition, Supplemental Release Fees may be owed if a contract with an FCB Player contains
bonuses, escalators, or options that are later triggered. The Release Fee (and any Supplemental
Release Fee) paid by the MLB Club is in addition to the compensation agreed to by the MLB
Club to the FCB Player in the player’s contract, which will be paid by the MLB Club directly to
the FCB Player.
109. Id.
110. See generally Alison Peck, Did MLB Clubs Violate RICO?, INT’L TRADE L. PROF.
BLOG (Nov. 17, 2018), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/inttradelaw/2018/11/did-mlb-clubsviolate-rico.html [https://perma.cc/N55L-6BAE]. Mimi Whitefield, MLB, Cuban Baseball
Federation Sign Agreement to Limit Defections, Trafficking of Players, WLRN (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.wlrn.org/post/mlb-cuban-baseball-federation-sign-agreement-limit-defectionstrafficking-players [https://perma.cc/KDW9-XLK8].
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Agreement. 111 However, proponents point to the fact that the
International Olympic Committee recognizes the FCB as independent
of the central government. 112 Amidst these disagreements, in April
2019, the Trump Administration invalidated the 2018 MLB-FCB
Agreement. 113 Nikole Thomas, OFAC’s acting assistant director of
licensing, wrote in a letter to MLB’s counsel that “a payment to the
Cuban Baseball Federation is a payment to the Cuban government.”114
A.

MLB’s Position

There are two opposing approaches to the sanctions against Cuba
with regard to the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement. On one hand,
supporters of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement, including MLB, argue
that the agreement is necessary to combat human trafficking and that
the release fee is not a payment to the Cuban government. On the other
hand, opponents argue that the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement is a threat
to national security and illegally stimulates the Cuban economy. This
Section and the following Section will examine each side’s primary
arguments in support of their position. 115 Finally, this Note will
determine which side’s interpretation is more in line with the objectives
of the Cuba sanctions and what next steps MLB and the Trump
Administration should take to eliminate the risk of human trafficking
and persistent international financial crime.
1. The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement Would End the Defection Norm
and Significantly Curb Human Trafficking
First, MLB’s stated purpose for the implementation of the 2018
MLB-FCB Agreement was the hope of reducing defection, 116 which is
not only dangerous but requires the involvement of human traffickers
and potential government corruption and bribery. 117 There have been
several instances in which MLB has turned a blind eye toward human
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Diamond & Salama, supra note 11.
See Kobritz, supra note 106; Zimbalist, supra note 9.
Diamond & Salama, supra note 11.
Id.
See infra Sections V.A. & V.B.
MLB Announcement, supra note 5.
See supra Part IV.

2020]

UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD

837

trafficking. The 2018 MLB-FCB agreement sought to eliminate these
instances.
MLB has recognized the burden that the current defection system
places on Cuban players, but has long been silent, and even complicit,
in the persistence of the human trafficking of Cuban-born baseball
players. 118 MLB Deputy Commissioner Dan Halem acknowledges that
Cuban players are “often forced to contract with criminal smuggling
gangs and pay a fair amount of money from their signing bonuses to
smugglers.” 119 The loopholes created by MLB rules and adherence to
the CACR, which encourage defection, have allowed Cuban defectors
to sign a combined US$300+ million in contracts in MLB since 2009,
and provide an undeniable financial incentive for human traffickers to
profit off of MLB’s leniency. 120 Often, smugglers are able to capitalize
on these loopholes to traffic Cuban players without committing a
material violation of the law. 121
In 2011, Cuban national Leonys Martin signed a contract with the
Texas Rangers of MLB worth US$15.5 million, including a US$5
million signing bonus. 122 Whereas a typical MLB agent will glean three
to five percent commission from that deal, Martin paid thirty-five
percent. 123 However, the money was not paid to an agent for the
procurement of a contract, as is typical; Martin paid Eliezer Lazo, a
notorious human trafficker who smuggled Martin out of Cuba.124
118. See Ahiza Garcia & Jose Pagliery, MLB Accused of Ignoring Cuban Player
Smuggling,
CNN
MONEY
(Dec.
15,
2016,
3:31
PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2016/12/15/news/mlb-cuban-baseball-players-smuggled/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7Z98-NYGS]; Lind, supra note 4.
119. Whitefield, supra note 110.
120. See generally Goorabian, supra note 71.
121. Id.
122. Richard Durrett, Rangers Sign Leonys Martin, ESPN (May 4, 2011),
http://www.espn.com/dallas/mlb/news/story?id=6478110
[https://perma.cc/B5XJ-T8MS];
Aaron Gleeman, Rangers Finalize $15.5 Million MLB Deal with Cuban Outfielder Leonys
Martin, NBC SPORTS (May 4, 2011, 12:20 PM), https://mlb.nbcsports.com/2011/05/04/rangersfinalize-15-5-million-mlb-deal-with-cuban-outfielder-leonys-martin/ [https://perma.cc/7YU73V66].
123. Nick Bond, Eliezer Lazo Pleads Guilty to Extortion of Cubans, Including Leonys
Martin,
SBNATION
(Aug.
22,
2014,
8:19
PM),
https://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2014/8/22/6058205/eliezer-lazo-guilty-plea-extortion-leonysmartin-cuba [https://perma.cc/TDA2-WF5W]. Drew Davison, Rangers’ Martin Says he was
Held Captive in Mexico After Defecting, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Dec. 25, 2013, 5:27
PM),
https://www.star-telegram.com/sports/mlb/texas-rangers/article3840783.html
[https://perma.cc/5PZ4-VE4L].
124. Id.
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Federal prosecutors charged Lazo with conspiring to smuggle, kidnap,
and extort Cuban Baseball Players. He was sentenced to over fourteen
years in federal prison for his role running a human-trafficking ring that
smuggled Cubans into Mexico, where they were held prisoner until
ransom payments were made under the threat of withholding the
processing of residency documents that would enable the players to
sign with MLB teams. 125 This scenario with Martin and Lazo was
commonplace among Cuban ballplayers, and the 2018 MLB-FCB
Agreement was designed to eliminate these criminal enterprises
entirely. 126
In 2017, a federal jury in Miami found a baseball agent, Bart
Hernandez, guilty of smuggling Cuban ballplayers into the United
States. 127 The government alleged a scheme of coercing players,
falsifying documents, and carrying out illegal border crossings in order
to collect large percentages of the contracts that Cuban players
eventually signed with MLB clubs. 128 After arranging with boat
captains to extract top baseball players from Cuba, the traffickers
allegedly set up the players in Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican
Republic with handlers and fixers who helped the players establish
residency in third countries through fraudulent means. 129 They then
helped the players apply to be “unblocked” by the OFAC so the players
could become MLB free agents.130 Players were then forced by
individuals like Hernandez into signing over between twenty and
thirty-five percent of their lucrative contracts with MLB teams, often
through threats against the players’ families and livelihoods if the
player chose not to comply with the smugglers. 131
125. See id.
126. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
127. Mike Oz, MLB Agent Found Guilty of Smuggling Cuban Baseball Players into the
U.S., YAHOO SPORTS (Mar. 15, 2017, 5:37 PM), Arthur Weinstein, Men Who Smuggled Cuban
Baseball Prospects to U.S. Sentenced to Prison, SPORTING NEWS (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.sportingnews.com/us/mlb/news/agent-trainer-smuggled-cuban-baseballprospects-united-states-sentenced-prison/atennt2w598h18ggfo4vkw8rw
[https://perma.cc/M38C-LKEE].
128. Alison Peck, Trump, Trade, Jose Abreu, and a Heineken: Trafficking in Cuban
Baseball
Players,
INT’L
TRADE
L.
PROF.
BLOG
(Apr.
27,
2017),
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/inttradelaw/2017/04/trump-trade-jos%C3%A9-abreu-and-aheineken.html [https://perma.cc/2JN8-DBGJ]. Oz, supra note 127.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.

2020]

UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD

839

Given the high-profile nature of these cases, MLB was under
immense pressure to address these human trafficking concerns. The
2018 MLB-FCB Agreement, which MLB claims eliminates the need
for agents to pay smugglers for residency in third party countries, will
dry up the market and ultimately serve as an impetus to remove human
traffickers from the Cuban immigration process entirely. However,
MLB is a non-state actor and therefore not a party to any international
treaty, nor technically obligated under international human trafficking
law. 132 Nonetheless, MLB is at risk of violating two related laws—
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (“FCPA”)— if the 2018 MLBFCB Agreement remains invalidated. 133 The league is acutely aware of
the risks of violating these laws, and it argues that an invalidation of
the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement will only contribute to an unwanted
increase in criminal enterprises. 134
2. The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement Would Prevent RICO
Violations by MLB and its Teams
The first of these laws under which MLB risks violation is RICO.
RICO prohibits the investment of proceeds of a pattern of racketeering
in an enterprise; the acquiring or maintaining of an interest in an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering; participating in an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering; or conspiring to do any of
the above. 135 To prove a RICO violation, prosecutors would have to
prove that the defendants (MLB or its teams) committed certain
predicate offenses, specifically enumerated in the definition of
racketeering activity. 136 These include identify fraud, 137 forgery or

132. See MATH NOORTMANN ET AL., NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77
(2015). Under international law, unless the treaty was created with the express intention to bind
the third-party non-state actor, and unless that third party non-state actor has consented with
signature, the third-party non-state actor is not technically bound to the treaty’s obligations.
133. See infra Sections V.A.2. & V.A.3.
134. See Peck, supra note 110.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2016).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006) (outlining criminal penalties not just for people who hold or
use fake IDs, but also for anyone who “knowingly transfers an identification document . . . or a
false identification document” if the person knew it was stolen or unlawfully produced).
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false use of passports, 138 misuse of passports, 139 and “any act or threat
involving murder, kidnapping, . . . robbery, bribery, extortion.”140
RICO violations call for federal prosecution and criminal penalties.141
“Any person injured in his business or property by any reason of a
violation of [RICO]” may bring civil lawsuits as well. 142 One example
of a potential RICO violation arises when law abiding sports agents in
the United States are locked out from representing Cuban players by
smugglers like Lazo and Hernandez, who coerce Cuban players to
retain them as agents as a result of the current corrupt defection
system. 143
In order to be guilty of participation in an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering, prosecutors or plaintiffs must prove that the
defendant conducted or participated in the “operation or management”
of the enterprise. 144 As applied, this can be very difficult to prove,
depending on the structure of the organization and its activities.145
However, case law dictates that MLB and the individual clubs likely
constitute “enterprises” that would be “separate from the individuals
participating in them” for purposes of a RICO section 1962 claim.146
Further, multiple illegal signings or player representations within a tenyear period may show the requisite pattern of acts to prove “part of an
ongoing entity’s regular way of doing business.” 147 Many MLB clubs
that feature multiple Cuban players may already be in violation of this
section. Also, team or MLB employees may have conducted or
participated in activities related to these questionable signings. The
definition of “operation or management” stretches quite far and often
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1543 (2002) (providing for fines or imprisonment for “whoever willfully
and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use any . . . false, forged,
counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or instrument purporting to be a passport”).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1544 (2002) (covering any entity who “willfully and knowingly
furnishes, disposes of, or delivers a passport to any person, for use by another person than the
person for whose use it was originally issued and designed”).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2016).
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. See Peck, supra note 110.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) (holding that
“The corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the corporation itself, a legally
different entity with different rights and responsibilities due to its different legal status”).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Busacca, 936 F.2d 232, 238 (6th Cir. 1991).
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attaches to anyone in the chain of command responsible for the
facilitation of illegally obtained players and residency papers. 148
If the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement remains invalidated and this
system continues, there is no doubt that MLB, its teams, or its
representatives will violate the predicate offenses to a RICO breach. In
fact, MLB and the DOJ are already aware of one very high-profile
potential violation. As part of the trial against Bart Hernandez, Cuban
defector and current MLB player Jose Abreu testified that he was
ordered to falsify a passport by his smugglers in order to safely obtain
entry into the United States from Haiti, the nation that he defected to in
order to obtain third-country residency. 149 Abreu was given a passport
in Haiti containing his photo, but with a false name and birth date, that
he was told to destroy in order to not raise suspicions about his entry
into the United States. 150 In a shocking revelation, Abreu testified that
he had no choice but to eat the page containing the false name before
his plane landed in Miami if he hoped to remain in the United States.151
“Little by little I swallowed that first page of the passport. I could not
arrive in the United States with a false passport,” he said. 152 Given
MLB’s alleged complicity in these smuggling operations, it is not hard
to imagine that MLB was aware that Abreu was arriving with falsified
documents, and intentionally did not inquire into the details behind
such falsification. This harrowing, infamous revelation is further
evidence that without a safe and legal deal in place between MLB and
Cuba, racketeering activity and RICO violations will continue. Thus,
to avoid RICO prosecution, and to curb the manipulation of
international law for financial gain by its teams and representatives,
MLB and its member teams have a very strong incentive to
reimplement the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement.

148. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993) (“outsiders” may violate
RICO if they are “associated with” an enterprise and participate in the conduct of its affairs).
149. Associated Press, Jose Abreu Ate Part of his Fake Passport Before U.S. Arrival,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.si.com/mlb/2017/03/01/jose-abreu-ate-fakepassport-chicago-white-sox-0 [https://perma.cc/4JMM-WC9D]; Paula McMahon, White Sox’s
Jose Abreu to Jury: I Ate Fake Passport on Way to U.S., CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 1, 2017,
3:26
PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/white-sox/ct-jose-abreu-ate-passportsmuggling-trial-20170301-story.html [https://perma.cc/JW5S-FFNG].
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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3. The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement would Alleviate Liability for
Current and Future FCPA Violations
Perhaps most significantly, MLB’s desire to implement the 2018
MLB-FCB Agreement is in direct response to the threat of FCPA
prosecution. Congress enacted the FCPA for the purpose of making it
unlawful for certain classes of persons and entities to make payments
to foreign government officials to assist in obtaining or retaining
business. 153 The FCPA at its core is an anti-bribery and anti-corruption
law, applying to payments made both in the United States and
abroad. 154 Specifically, MLB franchises may be liable based on
scouting and signing activities conducted on their behalf by third
parties in Cuba and other countries. FCPA liability attaches if the
covered party gives anything of value to any other person while
knowing that this third party will make an improper payment to a
foreign official. 155 The standard for knowledge is low—the covered
party can face liability for having mere awareness that the unlawful
conduct has a high probability of occurring. 156 The absence of an actual
knowledge requirement ensures that a covered party, like MLB, cannot
escape FCPA liability by being willfully blind to facts and
circumstances that would tend to indicate unlawful conduct. 157 In other
words, if a scout gives something of value to a member of a foreign
government, or to a “buscone” 158—international handlers or smugglers
like Lazo and Hernandez—who contracts with a foreign government to
clear the way for a player’s signing, that could be an FCPA violation.159
From the perspective of MLB, or its member teams, any payments or
kickbacks to buscones and any payments made to achieve the
falsification of papers for an athlete, including age records or drug

153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, et seq. (2010).
154. David Peet & David Mindell, The Other Moneyball: Professional Sports Leagues
and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 30 ENT. SPORTS LAW. 11, 11-12 (2014).
155. Id. at 12.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Buscone,
BASEBALL
REFERENCE,
https://www.baseballreference.com/bullpen/Buscone [https://perma.cc/C4RQ-XALX] (last visited Jan. 16, 2020)
(defining “buscone” as people who peddle young baseball players to scouts for teams from
Major League Baseball. Buscones identify promising players, train them, and then pocket a
share of the player’s signing bonus).
159. Peet & Mindell, supra note 154, at 13.
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testing records, would almost certainly fit within the broad definition
of business purpose. 160
MLB is currently in the midst of a FCPA investigation. 161 In
September 2018, authorities announced that a federal grand jury was
looking into MLB teams’ international dealings and has issued
subpoenas to club officials and other personnel involved in human
trafficking of Latin American, and primarily Cuban, athletes.162
Specifically, the DOJ is targeting potential violations of the FCPA in
relation to the bribing of government officials for better access to these
valuable Cuban players. 163 The probe is particularly concerned with
investigating buscones, who typically bribe local government officials
in order to facilitate the legal residency paperwork for the Cuban
defector. 164 In many cases, a buscone will arrange for an illegal and
dangerous defection out of Cuba and then when a player lands in the
Dominican Republic, Haiti or another country, the buscone will try to
arrange for residency, perhaps in unlawful ways. 165 The Justice
Department is likely interested in the role of American agents in
negotiating with buscones, and holding teams liable for giving
direction to these negotiations.
The dossier given to the FBI as part of this investigation suggests
the extent to which some MLB personnel are aware of—and brazenly
discuss—this unscrupulous culture and the potential for corruption.166
One particularly remarkable document shows that in 2015, a team’s
executives went so far as to develop a database that measured the
perceived “level of egregious behavior” displayed by fifteen of their
160. Id. at 12.
161. See Passan, supra note 4.
162. See Passan, supra note 4.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. Michael McCann, How the MLB-FCB Deal Could Face Legal Hurdles, Political
Resistance, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.si.com/mlb/2018/12/22/legalbreakdown-mlb-cuba-fcb-deal [https://perma.cc/48G7-NWHM]; Jon Wertheim, The Evidence
that Persuaded U.S. Department of Justice to Investigate MLB Recruitment of Foreign Players,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.si.com/mlb/2018/10/02/fbi-investigationmlb-atlanta-braves-los-angeles-dodgers [https://perma.cc/7LPG-AL6U].
166. Dayn Perry, Department of Justice Reportedly Looking into Corruption in
International Baseball Market by Dodgers, Others, CBS SPORTS (Oct. 3, 2018, 8:03 PM),
https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/department-of-justice-reportedly-looking-intocorruption-in-international-baseball-market-by-dodgers-others/
[https://perma.cc/68RD4QWM]. See also Wertheim, supra note 165
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own employees in Latin America. 167 That is, using a scale of “innocent
bystander” to “criminal,” front-office executives assessed their own
staff’s level of corruption. Documents show that five employees earned
a “criminal” rating. 168 Internal team communications show concerns
about what team officials called a “mafia” entrenched in their
operations, including a key employee who dealt “with the agents and
buscones” and was “unbelievably corrupt.” 169 The FBI suspected other
team personnel were tied to “altered books” or “shady dealings,”
according to the documents. 170 The dossier also appears to describe
efforts to circumvent federal laws and MLB rules requiring Cuban
players to establish residency in another country before negotiating and
signing with a team. 171 Among those efforts to circumvent, the dossier
includes a transcript of a text message conversation between two
Dodgers executives in which they discuss the need to “shred” a contract
signed with a player before MLB had approved the document.172 There
are also indications that dates on other official documents were
doctored before they were forwarded to the MLB office. 173
If reinstatement of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement fails, MLB is
at risk of numerous FCPA violations. Without a safe and legal route for
Cuban baseball players to gain access to MLB free agency, teams and
their representatives will continue to “brib[e] clerks or immigration
officials to change dates of birth on identification documents, or to
fabricate false identity documents,” in violation of the FCPA. 174 If the
DOJ brings these potential violations to light as part of its grand jury
probe, it will shine a spotlight on MLB’s alleged complicity in human
trafficking and international crime. Thus, to avoid FCPA prosecution,
and to curb the corrupt culture that has sprung out of the complicity
toward the defection regime, MLB and its member teams have a
significant interest in reimplementing the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Andrew S. Boutros et al., Batter Up: The FCPA Takes a Swing at Major League
Baseball,
SEYFARTH
(Oct.
11,
2018),
https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2018/10/batter-up-the-fcpa-takes-a-swingat-major-league-baseball/ [https://perma.cc/B2ZH-2LNW].
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4. The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement is Consistent with the Original
National Security Objectives of TWEA and CACR
Supporters of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement feel that there is no
harm to national security interests through any interaction between the
United States and the FCB, and believe that excluding sports, like
baseball, from the sanctions is actually a way to benefit the Cuban
people. 175 Supporters of the agreement argue that the sanctions have
only harmed the Cuban people while propping up the communist rulers
in the nation. 176 The American Association for World Health issued a
report indicating that the embargo “has dramatically harmed the health
and nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens. As
documented by [our] report, it is our expert medical opinion that the
United States embargo has caused a significant rise in suffering-and
even deaths-in Cuba.” 177
Some point to the “release fee” portion of the 2018 MLB-FCB
Agreement and argue that Cuba would use such money to fund
violations of human rights and endanger US national security. 178
However, the release fees are nominal, and the revenue will be used for
baseball purposes, including improving baseball stadiums and fields,
and purchasing equipment for youth leagues. 179 Putting aside the
debate over whether the FCB is an arm of the Cuban government, the
deal specifically calls for funds to remain independent of any national
175. Kaminsky, supra note 32, at 207.
176. See Jeff Passan, White House Scuttles MLB’s Cuban Agreement, ESPN (Apr. 8,
2019),
https://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/26472986/white-house-scuttles-mlb-cubanagreement [https://perma.cc/HZ7Z-R3D5]; Zimbalist, supra note 9.
177. The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health and Nutrition in Cuba, AM. ASS’N FOR
WORLD
HEALTH
(Apr.
14,
2014),
https://medicc.org/ns/documents/The_impact_of_the_U.S._Embargo_on_Health_&_Nutrition
_in_Cuba.pdf [https://perma.cc/ESU8-KU76].
178. See, e.g., Elliot Abrams, Trump Should Veto MLB’s Foul Deal with Cuba, NAT’L
REV. (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/12/mlb-cuba-deal-payoff-tocommunist-regime/ [https://perma.cc/SYM9-4TR4]; Louis Casiano, Marco Rubio Calls MLB
Deal with Cuba ‘a farce’ that needs to be ‘overruled’, FOX NEWS (Dec. 29, 2018),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/sen-marco-rubio-vows-to-stop-deal-allowing-cubanplayers-to-sign-with-mlb [https://perma.cc/ZH9B-QKF6].
179. Fernando Cutz, Major League Baseball’s Deal with Cuba Will Fight Human
Trafficking, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/oped/article225304760.html [https://perma.cc/74DC-SLC9]; Cuban Baseball Federation Stresses
Legitimacy of Release Fee for their Players, CUBASI (Jan. 5, 2019),
http://cubasi.com/sport/item/16430-cuban-baseball-federation-stresses-legitimacy-of-releasefee-for-their-players [https://perma.cc/9LZ7-2J2A].
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security implementation. 180 The funds are to be inserted into a quasinon-profit model that, at least according to MLB, will be used only for
the growth of youth baseball in Cuba. 181 Further, US$2 million is a drop
in the bucket from Cuba’s US$62.11 billion annual budget, or the US$3
billion annual revenue generated from tourism to the island. 182 US
airline, financial and telecommunications companies have legally made
payments to the Cuban government in excess of US$100 million in
recent years, with no recognition of national security concerns from the
Executive Branch. 183 The benefits that the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement
provide are tangible and plenty, and the risk to national security is
miniscule. In fact, by fighting human trafficking head on, this deal
indirectly promotes national security, by preventing millions of dollars
a year from ending up in the hands of violent gangs, smugglers, and
narco-traffickers.
B.

Trump Administration Position

1. The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement is a Threat to National Security
and Illegally Stimulates the Cuban Economy
In contrast to MLB’s position, the Trump Administration and the
Treasury Department emphatically assert that a payment to the FCB is
a payment to the Cuban government, and that any payment to the
Cuban government is a threat to national security. 184 Opponents of the
2018 MLB-FCB Agreement in the Trump administration contend that
it would betray the core and longstanding purpose of the embargo; to
prevent money from reaching Cuba, thus destabilizing the Cuban
economy and the Cuban government. 185 They allege this agreement
would give credibility and legitimacy to the Cuban government’s

180. See Zimbalist, supra note 9.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., McCann, supra note 165 (explaining that White House officials contend
that the agreement “betray[s] the core and longstanding purpose of the embargo: to prevent
money from reaching Cuba, thus destabilizing the Cuban economy and the Cuban government
that plans it”); Diamond & Salama, supra note 11 (“Nikole Thomas, OFAC’s acting assistant
director of licensing, wrote in a letter to MLB’s counsel that ‘a payment to the Cuban Baseball
Federation is a payment to the Cuban government’”).
185. McCann, supra note 165.
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leadership, which goes against the core fundamentals of the TWEA,
the CACR, and broad foreign policy with regards to Cuba. 186
The Trump Administration’s broad crackdown on the “Troika of
Tyranny”—the alliance of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—is
evidence of the hard stance toward Cuban relations. 187 The Trump
Administration has criticized Cuba for supporting Nicolás Maduro, the
Venezuelan despot who the United States opposes as an illegitimate
leader. Maduro has cut off humanitarian and financial assistance to any
of his dissidents in Venezuela and around the world. 188 Cuba has
remained a firm ally of Maduro, receiving Venezuelan oil in exchange
for doctors and other specialists and intelligence, which has helped
Maduro remain in power despite demands from Washington and more
than fifty other governments that he end his tyrannical rule. 189 The
Trump Administration is essentially asserting that any supplement to
the Cuban economy, even in the form of release fees paid to the FCB,
indirectly supports the illegitimate regime of Maduro in Venezuela.
Support of this regime would be, in effect, harming the country’s
national security by sacrificing American values of freedom and
democracy.
2. The Obama-Era OFAC Determination that the FCB is
Independent of the Cuban Government was Factually Incorrect
Republican legislators have vehemently pushed back on the
Obama-era OFAC determination that FCB is not part of the Cuban
government. Marco Rubio, a Cuban-American congressman, called
this determination “factually incorrect” and a “farce.” 190 He argued that
essentially, the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement is legalizing bribery from
186. Id.
187. Diamond & Salama, supra note 11.
188. Id.
189. See Vivian Salama, U.S. Expands Sanctions Against Venezuela Into an Embargo,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-expands-sanctions-againstvenezuela-into-an-embargo-11565053782 [https://perma.cc/KMJ2-MK57]; Those Cuban
Ballplayers? They Won’t Be Coming Here, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/opinion/trump-cuba-baseball.html
[https://perma.cc/74GF-LDSW].
190. Marco Rubio (@Marcorubio), TWITTER (Dec. 27, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://twitter.com/marcorubio/status/1078304735189450753?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwca
mp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1078304735189450753&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fspor
ts.yahoo.com%2Frepublicans-taking-aim-mlb-cuba-162529941.html [https://perma.cc/37AN3YEN].
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MLB clubs to Cuban government officials since the FCB’s finances are
entirely at the disposal of the governing regime. 191 Rubio went on to
compare the deal to a ransom paid to the Cuban government, i.e., a
payment to facilitate legalized human trafficking. 192 John Bolton,
President Trump’s former national security adviser, agrees with Rubio,
and explained that “Cuba wants to use baseball players as economic
pawns—selling their rights to Major League Baseball.” 193
The Trump administration provided some precedent for Rubio
and Bolton’s concerns regarding OFAC’s determination that the FCB
is part of the Cuban government. 194 The Trump administration
prohibited trade with much of the tourism industry in Cuba on the
grounds that Cuban military and intelligence interests owned
substantial hidden shares of those businesses. 195 But if a hotel with an
international brand is part of the Cuban government for purposes of the
embargo, it is hard to see how the FCB—which was led by the son of
Fidel Castro and is one of the most prominent organizations in the
country—is not. The Obama-era OFAC relied on the fact that the
Olympic Committee treats FCB as a nongovernmental organization.196
However, the relevant question is whether the FCB is part of the Cuban
government as defined in the embargo statutes and regulations, not
under Olympic Committee policies. 197

191. Scott McDonald, Yankee Pitcher Aroldis Chapman, Senator Marco Rubio React to
Trump Administration Rescinding Deal Between MLB And Cuban Baseball, NEWSWEEK (Apr.
8, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-administration-rescinds-obama-era-deal-betweenmajor-league-baseball-1389984 [https://perma.cc/TJK6-WZTK].
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Diamond & Salama, supra note 11.
195. See Alison Peck, Major League Baseball Can Help Cuban Players Without Helping
Cuba, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/oped/article224037590.html [https://perma.cc/A5EH-U3NE]; Sarah Marsh & Roberta Rampton,
New U.S. Government Rules Restrict Travel and Trade with Cuba, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2017, 9:09
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cuba/new-u-s-government-rules-restrict-traveland-trade-with-cuba-idUSKBN1D81XN [https://perma.cc/398J-SULY]; Vanessa Romo,
Trump Administration Clamps Down on Travel to Cuba, Bans Cruise Ships, NPR (June 4, 2019,
8:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/04/729825471/trump-administration-clamps-down-ontravel-to-cuba-bans-cruise-ships [https://perma.cc/AC46-PZLX].
196. Id.
197. Id.
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3. The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement was Merely an Attempt to
Circumnavigate Continued Criminal Violations
Opponents of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement criticize its timing,
alleging that MLB is simply trying to save face as more details of its
complicity in the human trafficking of Cuban players and FCPA
violations are revealed. 198 Convicted smuggler Gilberto Suarez claims
that MLB tolerates—knowingly or unknowingly—a criminal
enterprise transporting players to the United States. 199 He claims that
MLB clubs, which are not allowed to scout in Cuba, are always
traveling wherever the Cuban teams go, communicating with agents
and smugglers simultaneously to get intel on when a player will be
available to sign. 200 MLB’s concern was never with the conditions of
their future player’s defection or whether his passport and residency
documents were compliant with the applicable law—only whether his
residency was facially “legal.” 201 In fact, certain investigators on the
matter even believed that MLB teams were conspiring with human
traffickers to bring specific players out of Cuba. 202 Thus, the Trump
Administration sees the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement as less of a means
of curbing human trafficking, and more of an attempt to save face
before criminal and civil penalties are officially levied.

198. Abrams, supra note 178; McCann, supra note 165.
199. See Scott Eden, Federal Investigations into Cuba Smuggling, Major League Baseball
Slow, ABC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015, 1:43 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/federalinvestigations-cuban-smuggling-major-league-baseball-slow/story?id=32949775
[https://perma.cc/3Z9S-PC2L]; see also Jose Pagliery & Ahiza Garcia, MLB Accused of
Ignoring
Cuban
Baseball
Player
Smuggling,
CNN
(Dec.
15,
2016),
https://money.cnn.com/2016/12/15/news/mlb-cuban-baseball-playerssmuggled/index.html?iid=EL [https://perma.cc/79ZK-5KWT].
200. Id.
201. See Eddie Dominguez, Cuban Players, Human Trafficking; and MLB, THE SUNDAY
LONG READ (Sept. 16, 2018), https://sundaylongread.com/2018/09/16/baseball-cop-bookexcerpt-cuba/ [https://perma.cc/42ET-8ZV3].
202. Id.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MLB AND THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION TO END THE CRIMES INHERENT IN THE
DEFECTION PROCESS WHILE COMPLYING WITH ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS
A.

MLB Should Implement a Worldwide Draft

The baseball community has long explored the idea of
implementing a worldwide draft, with the main benefit being the
elimination of the lucrative free agency status of international players,
specifically targeting Cuban defectors. 203 A worldwide draft would put
every domestic and international player on an even playing field. It
would eliminate the need for defection, and in turn eliminate the
dangers and crimes related to human trafficking, because there would
be no financial incentive to obtain residency in a third county before
coming to the United States. It would also reduce the incentive for
smugglers, because they would receive only a fraction of the finder’s
fee (draft salaries are much lower than free agency salaries) 204 they
currently obtain by coordinating defection and residency approval in a
third country. This change to the MLB rules, as applied, could comply
with the CACR and the Trump administration’s crackdown of the
omnibus sanctions, while achieving MLB’s desired goal of eliminating
human trafficking and providing a safe route for foreigners to play
baseball in the United States.
However, a worldwide amateur draft is unlikely to solve the
problem facing Cuban baseball players and MLB is unlikely to adopt
this proposal. For one, it would require MLB to repeal the Kuhn
directive, because the league currently prohibits scouting in Cuba.205
Additionally, it is not entirely clear if this policy would comply with
the CACR. In theory, it is still a CACR violation if the Cuban national
does not denounce his citizenship, is drafted into MLB, and is paid a
special, taxable salary, even if it is a miniscule salary in comparison to
a potential free agency deal. Further, the Major League Baseball
Players Association (“MLBPA”) and various MLB officials, teams,
and player agents oppose a draft, because it lowers salaries across the
league and thus gives the owners an advantage in the balance of
203. Cwiertney, supra note 16, at 426.
204. See id.
205. Solomon, supra note 2, at 181.
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bargaining power. 206 Because of this opposition and uncertainty, a draft
is unlikely until the sanctions are lifted, or at the very least,
weakened. 207
B.

Use International Free Agency within MLB’s Discretion

The collective-bargaining agreement between MLB and its
players already gives the MLB Commissioner discretion to determine
the residency of a player for purposes of international free agency
eligibility. 208 The commissioner could use that discretion to say that a
Cuban player who comes directly to the United States will not be
treated as a resident of the United States for a limited period, perhaps
one year. This would essentially legalize defection directly to the
United States, but still promote the open market free agency for Cuban
players.
The MLBPA has no reason to object, because salaries for Cuban
players would be determined on the open market and not through the
international draft. 209 But this solution would not entirely end
trafficking, and Cuban baseball players would still have to escape from
Cuba to play in MLB. Furthermore, given the current border crisis and
crackdown on immigration in the United States, 210 there is no guarantee
that this process would be acceptable to the current administration.
Despite these drawbacks, allowing players to come directly to the
United States and sign as free agents would give federal and local law
enforcement much more power to investigate and prosecute crimes of
extortion, confinement, and violence against players. 211 MLB club
owners might need to negotiate harder and pay a bit more for players
in such a free market, but this solution could protect the next generation
206. Frankel, supra note 21, at 420.
207. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 155.
208. Peck, supra note 195.
209. Cutz, supra note 179.
210. See, e.g., Nina Lakhani, More Cubans Seek Asylum in Mexico Amid Clampdown on
Legal
Path
to
US,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
3,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/03/more-cubans-seek-asylum-in-mexico-amidclampdown-on-legal-path-to-us [https://perma.cc/LZK3-95SR]; Mary Beth Sheridan, Cubans
Were Once Privileged Migrants to the United States. Now They’re Stuck at the Border, Like
Everyone Else, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/cubanswere-once-privileged-migrants-to-the-united-states-now-theyre-stuck-at-the-border-likeeveryone-else/2019/11/04/65f1a4ea-fa60-11e9-9e02-1d45cb3dfa8f_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6GST-M5WJ].
211. Cutz, supra note 179.
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of Cuban players from trafficking without supporting the Cuban
government. This option is also available to MLB now, under its own
rules, and would not be subject to legal restriction or political whim.
Unfortunately, MLB deputy commissioner and Chief Legal
Officer Dan Halem has rebuffed this solution. “There’s simply no
evidence that making that change would prevent human trafficking,”
says Halem. “In fact, it’s my understanding that it’s actually harder to
enter the U.S. than many other countries. So, such a rule change may
result in more sophisticated smuggling of Cuban players to bring them
directly to the United States.” 212
C. MLB Should Agree to Increased Monitoring through
Independent Audits
Because implementation of the aforementioned solutions is highly
unlikely, MLB must find a way to stay in compliance with the sanctions
while changing its international signing policies enough to curb human
trafficking and the international financial criminal violations. In
response to the proliferation of these crimes, professional leagues and
their member franchises should closely examine high-risk interactions
with officials of foreign governments. MLB should remain particularly
sensitive to interactions that involve third parties acting on behalf of
the league or one of its teams. MLB should adopt standard operating
procedures specifically directed at corruption and bribery concerns for
league and team employees, as well as third parties. MLB should also
consider establishing a regular training schedule for these employees
and licensed team agents in order to ensure awareness of league-wide
anticorruption policies. Additionally, MLB should consider following
the advice of federal regulators by implementing an effective
compliance program, which includes due diligence of any prospective
foreign agents that receive payments, either from the league or one of
its member teams. 213 Teams should consider having their operations
periodically audited by an independent third party to evaluate FCPA
and RICO compliance.

212. Tim Padgett, Does Baseball Deal Help Cuban People or Cuban Regime?, WLRN
(Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.wlrn.org/post/does-baseball-deal-help-cuban-people-or-cubanregime-trump-may-decide [https://perma.cc/MP3H-DP4P].
213. See generally Peet & Mindell, supra note 154.
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D. The Trump Administration Should Reinstate the 2018 MLB-FCB
Agreement
Perhaps the most obvious recommendation is to simply reinstate
the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement. The agreement would have allowed
Cuban baseball players to sign freely with any MLB team, would have
allowed Cuban players to live in or visit Cuba, and would have
provided for MLB scouts to travel to Cuba and sign players without the
need for defection, buscones, or the violation of any international
law. 214 In exchange for this access, the FCB would garnish the wages
of its former players who sign MLB contracts. 215 The garnished funds
were to be used to stimulate baseball infrastructure in Cuba. 216
Reinstating the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement is likely the most
comprehensive solution to curb human trafficking while still adhering
to the goals of the omnibus economic sanctions, but reinstatement is
highly unlikely. In 2016, MLB received a license from OFAC
confirming that FCB was not a part of the Cuban government.217 Just
as OFAC abruptly reversed course when it scuttled the agreement with
its determination that FCB was actually part of the communist
government, it could just as quickly re-interpret the FCB’s
independence along International Olympic guidelines and confirm that
FCB is once again, not an arm of the communist regime. However, this
reversal is not likely to occur under the current administration for two
specific reasons. First, even if MLB were to challenge OFAC’s
determination that the FCB is part of the Cuban government, judicial
review of OFAC’s decisions are “highly deferential,” even if the
decision is “of less than ideal clarity.” 218 Second, the Trump
Administration’s hardline stance against direct financial support to
Cuba, especially in the context of Cuba’s allegiance to Maduro of
Venezuela, 219 is likely to stonewall any chance of reinstatement of the
2018 MLB-FCB Agreement. Despite the unlikelihood of reinstatement
214. Zimbalist, supra note 9.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Diamond & Salama, supra note 11.
218. Epsilon Elecs., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, 429 U.S. App. D.C. 195,
857 F.3d 913 (2017); see also supra Part III.
219. Margaret Talev, Trump Demands End to Maduro Regime in Broad Attack on
Socialism, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0218/trump-courts-2020-hispanic-vote-in-miami-with-venezuela-remarks
[https://perma.cc/F9L7-JEL5].
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under the current administration, there are lobbyists putting pressure on
the Trump administration to consider reinstating the agreement.220
These groups should continue to promote the merit of the agreement
and its anti-human trafficking provisions in hopes that a future US
presidential administration prioritizes the improvement of US-Cuba
relations through the reinstatement of the 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The 2018 MLB-FCB Agreement will not restore democracy in
Cuba; nor will it end the human rights abuses that take place daily on
the island. However, normalization of US and Cuba relations through
baseball diplomacy would represent a small but immensely positive
step that aligns with the objectives of the Cuba sanctions. Will the 2018
MLB-FCB Agreement collaterally benefit the Cuban government?
Potentially. There is no real way of knowing if the FCB is part of the
central communist government. Is the agreement worthwhile in the
context of preventing human trafficking and international criminal
activity? Absolutely. The dollars that potentially flow into Cuba from
this agreement will have a miniscule impact and will not substantially
stabilize the communist regime, threaten national security, or harm
democracy. In fact, there is no risk to national security by allowing
Cuban baseball players to achieve their dream of playing Major
League Baseball safely and legally. The value of the 2018 MLB-FCB
Agreement in curbing human trafficking, FCPA violations, and RICO
violations far outweighs any stimulus to the Cuban government that
this agreement potentially provides. Thus, the 2018 MLB-FCB
Agreement would not violate the original objective of the TWEA and
the CACR and should be reimplemented with responsible and
enforceable monitoring requirements.

220. See Raymond Arke, Ballard Partners to Pinch Hit for MLB as it Lobbies Trump for
Deal
with
Cuba,
OPEN
SECRETS
(May
13,
2019),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/05/ballard-partners-to-pinch-hit-for-mlb/
[https://perma.cc/6VFH-HBK4]; see also Brian Schwartz, MLB Hires Trump-allied Lobbying
for Guidance on ‘Trafficking’ of Cuban Baseball Players, CNBC (May 13, 2019, 6:49 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/13/mlb-hires-trump-allied-lobbying-firm-over-cubanbaseball.html [https://perma.cc/UG9N-KJTA].

